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The issue of climate change has been a major feature in public discourse for more than
twenty-five years and the debate has vociferously engaged scientists, politicians, and the
general public. Climate change is impacting the local, state, national and global levels,
ranging from the loss of coastal land in Massachusetts to the loss of permafrost in
Alaska. The challenge to addressing the crisis that these climate change impacts are
presenting has inspired various proposals, both legal and scientific. The 2012 case Alec L.
v. Jackson has brought the issue of Atmospheric Trust Litigation and potential claims for
injury due to climate change to the forefront. This article analyzes the Atmospheric Trust
Litigation theory for its viability as a potential remedy to address the issue of climate
change by looking at the potential obstacles presented by the Public Trust Doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of climate change has been a major feature in the news
and public discourse for more than twenty-five years, and the debate has
vociferously engaged scientists, the general public, and politicians. Private
individuals have sought to remedy alleged injuries on either a collective or
individual basis.2 The individual states have also sought redress of claims
of actual or imminent injury through both the state and federal courts in the
United States. Climate change is causing impacts on the local, state,
national and global levels, ranging from loss of coastal land in
Massachusetts to the loss of permafrost in Alaska.3 The challenge to
address the crisis that these climate change impacts are presenting has
inspired various proposals, both legal and scientific.
The recently decided Alec L. v. Jackson case has brought the issue
of Atmospheric Trust Litigation and potential claims for injury due to
climate change to the forefront.4 The Atmospheric Trust Litigation (ATL)
1 Richard Black, A Brief History of Climate Change, BBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013,6:58 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15874560.
'See generally Kanuk v. State, No. 3AN1107474, 2012 WL 8262438 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 16,
2012) (discussing the dismissal of an action in which the lower court denied the Plaintiff s request
to declare the atmosphere as part of the public trust, which the State of Alaska has a fiduciary
duty to manage, and that the State of Alaska has failed their duty by not engaging in rulemaking
to reduce carbon emissions by 6%).
3 Id.; See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006).
4 See generally Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012).
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theory proposes that the avenue through which to address climate change is
to expand the Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) to include the atmosphere. This
expansion seeks to hold state and federal governments responsible, under a
fiduciary standard, for their actions, or inaction, related to the protection of
the atmosphere and other matters subject to the PTD.6 The courts have
wrestled with the issue of expanding the basic premise of the PTD.7 The
courts have also looked at related resources under the PTD when analyzing
cases." Professor Richard Lazarus once described the efforts to expand the
PTD in the following manner:
Commentators and judges alike have made efforts to 'liberate,'
'expand,' and 'modify' the doctrine's scope, yet its basic focus
remains relatively unchanged. Courts still repeatedly return to the
doctrine's historical function to determine its present role. When
the doctrine is expanded, more often than not the expansions
require tortured constructions of the present rather than
repudiations of the doctrine's past.9
This article discusses why the ATL theory is an unworkable
attempt to expand the PTD beyond its common law foundation. Even if the
court permitted the expansion of the PTD, the doctrines of Standing and
Political Question should deny these claims unless modified into the more
familiar form of private nuisance or public nuisance cases outside the scope
of areas regulated by the EPA.
Part I of this article addresses the background of the PTD and ATL.
Part II addresses the progression of the PTD, climate change litigation, and
ATL, including a discussion of the policy considerations of these doctrines.
Part III examines standing and the political question doctrine in PTD and
ATL cases to determine the applicability of the doctrines to the plaintiff's
claims. This article concludes that the ATL theory can be utilized in
jurisdictions where the legislature has previously provided a basis for the
air or atmosphere as a part of the Public Trust; however, in jurisdictions
where this has not occurred, the ATL theory seeks to circumvent
s See generally Adjudicating Climate Change infra Part I.B; Nature's Trust infra Part I.B.
6 Id.
See generally Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983); Marks v. Whitney, 6
Cal.3d 251, 259-60 (Cal. 1971) (discussing the Public Trust as traditionally defined and how the
trust has been expanded to include additional related rights).
8 See generally Geer v. Conn., 161 U.S. 519 (1896); see infra note 21.
SJ.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working
Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 229 (2006) (citing Richard J. Lazarus,
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public
Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 710-11 (1986)).
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unfavorable political outcomes with legal actions, which runs afoul of non-
justiciability limitations.
I. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
AND ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION
A. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The Public Trust Doctrine in American jurisprudence traces its
roots to the mid-1800s when the Supreme Court of the United States
tackled the issue in two cases, Martin v. Waddell's Lessee and Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan.10 These cases represent the origin of the concept that the
absolute right to "navigable waters, and the soils under them, passed to the
states upon admission to the union, for the 'common use' of the 'people."1 1
The PTD has developed almost primarily as an issue of state law, by virtue
of the title passing to the states upon their admission to the union. 12
While these cases helped define the initial scope of the doctrine,
the roots of the PTD are traceable to England where the common law
established "the King is the owner of all navigable rivers, bays, and shores
below low water mark, and he owns them, not as trustee, but in full
dominion and propriety." 13 The King's ownership of the land was subject to
two limitations: "That these waters shall remain highways for passage and
navigation;" and "[t]hat while they remain ungranted there is a common
right of fishery therein." 14 There is also a foundation for the PTD in Roman
law as the Supreme Court discussed in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho by citing the Institutes of Justinian's characterization of the public
use of rivers and ports and their commonality. 15
10 Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine:
Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty? 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 54 (1998)
(hereinafter Timid Approach).
" Timid Approach, supra note 10, at 54.; Cf. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469
(1988) (holding that the State gained title in fee simple to lands influenced by the tides even
though they were not navigable at the time of Mississippi's admission to the Union).
1 District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1984); See also supra
note 5; Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its
Future, 45 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 665, 680-85 (discussing application of PTD in the federal system
and citing to Illinois Central that the decision was a "judicial explication of state, rather than
federal, law principles") (hereinafter The Public Trust Doctrine).
13 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 52 (1821).14 Id.
1 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); See Also Robin Kundis Craig,
Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines,
34 VT. L. REV. 781,798 (2010) (hereinafter Adapting to Climate Change); See generally Edgar
Washburn, Alejandra Nufiez, Is the Public Trust a Viable Mechanism to Regulate Climate
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American jurisprudence has departed from this absolute ownership.
It has cast aside the trustee relationship, as established by English common
law, in favor of "[a] public trust doctrine [that] holds... certain crucial
natural resources are the shared, common property of all citizens [and] that
[they] cannot be subject to private ownership and must be preserved and
protected by the government." 16 This departure from the English common
law tradition is notable because the King's absolute title permitted him to
treat the land in any manner he wished,17 subject to the limitations for
navigation and fisheries, as opposed to the American common law tradition
to which creates a "fiduciary obligation to protect such natural assets" to
which the state is held.' The fiduciary duty has traditionally "functioned as
a constraint on states' ability to alienate public trust lands and as a
limitation on uses that interfere with trust purposes. "19 This fiduciary duty
limitation is manifested in two manners: one is a constraint on the state
legislature in terms of the laws enacted, and the other is the act of the state
in conveying land subject to the PTD.20
1. Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine
In Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, the Supreme Court provided the
foundation for the PTD in American jurisprudence. The Court reasoned
that "[w]hen the revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character, held the absolute right to all
their navigable waters, and the soil under them; for their own common use,
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the
general government. "21 The states' ownership of the PTD land is subject to
Change? 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 23, 25 (Fall 2012) (hereinafter Is the Public Trust);
JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES, 1.2.1, 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. Ed. 1876); Lloyd R. Cohen,
The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 249-53 (1992)
(hereinafter Economic Perspective).
" Patrick C. McGinley, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine, 65 PLANNING &
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW No. 8, p. 7 (August 2013) (Citing Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970)).
" Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 25 ("The king held title to the soil beneath the sea and
arms of the sea (navigable waters) in his sovereign capacity and could grant the beds of navigable
waters into private ownership ... ').
18 Id.; See generally Geer, 161 U.S. at 519; See also The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 12, at
676-79 (discussing the applicability of the PTD to fish and wildlife resources).
'9 Air Fla., Inc., supra note 12, at 1082-83.
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
1 Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); See supra note 5; See also Adapting to
Climate Change, supra note 15, at 798-9; Washburn and Nutez, supra note 15, at 25 (explaining
how the Equal Footing doctrine operates such that "each subsequently admitted state acquired the
beds of navigable waters in its sovereign capacity at statehood" subject to a federal law limitation
that "the navigable waters that passed to the states under the equal footing doctrine are those that
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federal government restrictions, but this does not result in the federal
government being subject to the standard as the states. Since the Supreme
Court established the basis for the PTD, courts have wrestled with the issue
of whether to expand the basic premise of the PTD and introduce new areas
that may be subject to the doctrine.23 Courts have also looked at related
resources, such as the wildlife, and scientific endeavors when considering
expanding upon the traditional lands, also known as "res communes,"
under the PTD.
In Air Florida, Inc., the Court referred to a series of cases in which
the courts in California have expanded the PTD from the traditional water-
related uses to include "swimming and similar recreation, aesthetic
enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and preservation of flora and fauna
indigenous to public trust lands." 26 The PTD has been utilized as a source
of authority to seek damages for water-related harms when an oil spill
causes waterfowl to be killed. The basis of this authority was that
"[u]nder the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United
States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's
interest in natural wildlife resources." 28 The right instilled in the
government did not "derive from ownership of the resources but from a
duty owing to the people." 2 9
The expansion of the PTD has been adopted by some courts, but
the judicial expansion has not exceeded the scope of navigable waters.30
are navigable-in fact or are susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce over which trade and travel are, or may be, conducted at the time of
statehood."[emphasis added]); See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward
an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010).
" Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 25 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
171-72 (1979)); See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
" Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 259-60 (Cal. 1971) (discussing the Public Trust as
traditionally defined and how the trust has been expanded to include additional related fights).
1 Geer, 161 U.S. at 519 at 525 (discussing what was divided among men in private ownership
and those things that remained in common ownership - "referred to by jurisconsults [as] 'res
communes.' These things included "the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its
shores).
' See supra note 16; See generally Geer, 161 U.S. at 519.
6 See supra note 12.
" Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (discussing a cause of
action for damages, statutory penalties, and cleanup costs where the defendant caused an oil spill
in the Chesapeake Bay in 1976 that resulted in the death of approximately 30,000 migratory
birds).
" See supra note 27.
9 See supra note 17.
'
0 Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 26 (citing to Marks and Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct.,
33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983), as examples of the limits of the judicial expansion of Public Trust
Doctrine).
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Additionally, some states have expanded their definitions of navigable
waters to include more waterways than would be included under the federal
standard. 31 The addition of environmental rights in a state constitution or
other statute should not be confused with an expansion of the common law
PTD as that expansion is an exercise of the individual state's police
power.32 On the topic of expansion, Richard Lazarus contended that the
strength of PTD "necessarily lies in its origins; navigable waters and
submerged lands are the focus of the doctrine, and the basic trust interests
in navigation, commerce, and fishing are the object of its guarantee of
public access." 33
2. Limitations on the State by the Public Trust Doctrine
There are two theories that courts have applied to restrict the state's
treatment of the res communes of the PTD.34 The first is that courts have
imposed an affirmative duty upon the State to reasonably protect or
conserve Public Trust resources, but this approach is in the minority.3 5
Most courts have instead imposed limitations on State "actions that
adversely affect the [Public Trust] concerns" and this has been further
broken down into three approaches.36 These approaches are as follows: (1)
A requirement that the action at issue "satisfy a public trust purpose;" (2) a
requirement that the State consider "adverse impact on the trust resource"
before acting if the impact is "either minimal or necessary," and (3) that the
action be specifically authorized by the legislature when it is being taken
by the executive branch.37
The seminal case in PTD jurisprudence for the limitations on State
action by the fiduciary duty imposed is Illinois Central.38 In Illinois
Central, the Court limited the ability of the Illinois state legislature to
convey title of the lakebed of Chicago's harbor to the Illinois Central
31 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 647-8 (1986) (hereinafter
Changing Conceptions).
3 Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 26.
3 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working
Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 229 (2006) (citing Richard J. Lazarus,
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public
Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 710-11 (1986)); See generally George P. Smith & Michael
W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006).
3 Changing Conceptions, supra note 31, at 650-51.
3 Compare Changing Conceptions, supra note 31, at 650-51 with Adjudicating Climate Change,
infra Part I.B and Nature's Trust, infra Part I.B.
36 Changing Conceptions, supra note 31, at 650-51.
37 Id.
38 See supra note 20.
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Railroad Company. 39 This limitation is due to the fact that the "public trust
cannot be relinquished by the state, except as to parcels used in promoting
the interest of the public and without the substantial impairment of the
public interest in the remaining lands and waters." 40 This limitation has
been adopted in "virtually every state jurisdiction as a matter of state
common law." 4 1
The pursuit of constraint by legal action has been seen time and
time again to "stave off the greedy or harmful proposed uses of state water,
waterbodies, watercourses, and their related resources" and provided "an
effective tool for judicial oversight [of] ... private interests and complacent
state agencies."42 This use of legal action has given rise to various theories
utilized to protect the res communes. The Atmospheric Trust Litigation
theory is the most recent example of this effort.
B. ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION
1. Domestic Application
ATL involves the notion that courts "can hold governments at the
national and subnational level accountable for reducing carbon emissions"
by virtue of the atmosphere being "characterized ... as one of the assets in
the trust, shared as property among all nations of the world as co-tenants."43
The theory would hold governments at various levels responsible on a
fiduciary basis for public trust res and seek court ordered relief for any
violations of that duty.t Courts would essentially be ensuring that the other
" See generally supra note 20. Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 165, at 801
(distinguishing private ownership of public trust doctrine lands is also subject to limitation based
on the navigability of the waterway); Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 25 (discussing the
limitation for private owners will vary from no limitation for owners of non-navigable waterways,
to strict limitations on property rights that extend only to the waterway).
40 See supra note 20, at 453; See also, Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 25.
41 Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 25 (discussing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. as an example of legal
action to curtail the actions of the State legislature, as opposed to an agency, that had been
complacent in its grant of land to the railroad company only to realize the error at a later date).
4' Timid Approach, supra note 10, at 55.
43 MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:
STATE, NATIONAL, aND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 99 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M.
Osofsky eds., 2011) (hereinafter Adjudicating Climate Change); See generally Hope M. Babcock,
The Public Trust Doctrine: What A Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393 (2009) (discussing
the reasoning behind using the PTD as a stopgap measure before positive law can be enacted);
Peter Manus, To a Candidate in Search of an Environmental Theme: Promote the Public Trust,
19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315 (2000).
4 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 100; See also MARY CHRISTINA Wood,
NATURE'S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 156-61, 221-22
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branches of government are fulfilling their duties as trustee of the Public
Trust.4 5 The violation that the PTD seeks to have rectified is one where the
trust has been used "as a prerogative for the advantage of government, as
distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as
distinguished from the public good."4 6
The strategy, as a whole, would seek to apply the PTD or a
country-specific derivation, as applicable, "toward enforcing planetary
carbon reduction requirements, formulated to hold each government
accountable for its share of the necessary reduction."47 The stratagem
would be distinguishable in the United States domestic courts from those
claims that sought relief under the various environmental statutes, such as
the Clean Air Act.4" The rationale for using the PTD, as opposed to other
strategies, is three-fold.49 First, the doctrine "is the most fundamental legal
mechanism to ensure government safeguards natural resources necessary
for public welfare and survival."50 Second, the PTD is more likely to be
justiciable because "judicial enforcement of fiduciary obligations is
necessary when the political branches abdicate their responsibility to
protect the res of the trust."5 ' A third justification for the use of the doctrine
is based on the human rights argument of a "right to life" and the doctrine
being "a judicial tool to ensure that political branches of government
protect the [right]. "52
The fiduciary duty as trustee, under the PTD, to protect the res is
not a duty that can be disclaimed.53 The Public Trust is described as an
"attribute of government" and thus the management of the trust is
(discussing a multi-factor test for defining the res under the Nature's Trust adaptation of the
Public Trust doctrine and how the Atmospheric Trust Litigation theory approaches climate
change for the res of the trust) (2013) (hereinafter Nature's Trust).
4 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 100; Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 14
(explaining how Nature's Trust is another step in determining ownership for resources based on
the Public Trust Doctrine and thus an obligation upon the government).
46 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 102.
4 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 100.
* Id. at 100.
* Id. at 100-03; See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 14.
Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 101.
1 Mark Belleville & Katherine Kennedy, Cool Lawsuits - Is Climate Change Litigation Dead
After Kivalina v. Exxonmobil?, 7 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 51, 82 (2013) (citing the
amicus law professors) (hereinafter Cool Lawsuits); Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 128
(explaining how the duty imposed on government by the public trust is discharged when the
government's conduct is "directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of he
people").
s' See supra note 47.
s3 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 103.
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applicable to all government bodies.54 While this traditionally has been the
case, the concept of the PTD in American jurisprudence has always been
"controversial... [due to] U.S. law favor[ing] ownership of natural
resources as private property. "'5 This controversy centers around the fact
that the PTD "treat[s] some resources as subject to a perpetual trust that
forecloses private exclusionary rights."56 The beneficiaries of this trust are
"present and future generations" thus enabling citizens to pursue
enforcement of the government's duty as the trustee of the trust.57 The
fiduciary duty sought to be enforced is one that requires a trustee to
"protect the assets of the trust from damage. "s5
The ATL theory seeks to analogize trust assets with transboundary
trust assets, such as a waterway shared between states, or migratory birds
that migrate across borders.59 Under the ATL theory, the fiduciary duty is
translated to the federal government from the state government when there
is a national interest in the resource, such as under Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 60
In order to move forward, the theory presupposes a series of cases
on an ATL basis that does not necessarily need to be brought in every
jurisdiction.61 Once a sufficient number of "precedent- setting lawsuits"
create a "clear liability framework" then that can "spur necessary action on
the political level nationally" and eliminate need for massive litigation to
62
continue. A declaratory judgment may also be sufficient to move the ball
forward and become a "yardstick for political action. "63 The declaratory
' Id.; See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 16 (discussing how different views exist about
the Public Trust, but that despite being a judicial tool the "doctrine's fundamental applicability to
the legislative and administrative branches").
Cool Lawsuits, supra note 51, at 82.
Id.
Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 104.
Id. at 105 (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §176 that states "The trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property." [emphasis
added]).
9 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 106 n. 33; See also Nature's Trust at 146-47;
See generally J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A
Future Convergence? 45 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 915 (2012).
60 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 107 (citing CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) n.
40, as an example of co-trusteeship); See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 133-36
(discussing the status of the federal government as a co-trustee in management of the public
trust). Contra Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (stating that the State's succeeded
Great Britain in sovereignty over their land, subject to the same restrictions as those imposed
upon the King under British common law). For further discussion, see infra Part II.
61 Id.
6' Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 113-14; See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44,
at 226-27 (discussing the types of actions that can be brought).
63 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 115.
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judgment may come from various levels of a sovereign, such as from a
"municipal [judge], state court [judge], and federal [judge] to enforce the
fiduciary obligation against the various levels of government." 6 4 The
carbon reduction plan may take various shapes, such as "carbon taxes,
infrastructure projects, or transfer of public investment" and these may be
outside the scope of judicial enforcement due to non-justiciability
standards.6 5
2. Global Applications
For application of ATL on a global scale, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is cited as creating an
obligation for the parties to "protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations... " and this is a way to require foreign
sovereigns to comply with carbon emission reductions.6 6 This obligation
will position "nations... as sovereign co-tenant trustees of a shared
atmosphere" and potential permit enforcement of the obligation to "protect
the climate system. "67 In order to accomplish the goal of carbon emission
reduction, each sovereign would be attributed a reduced target goal and this
goal could be "scaled down to each subnational jurisdictional level." 68 This
approach would spread the responsibility equally amongst the nations and
allows for intra-nation divisions as well, with the goal of eliminating the
"developed versus undeveloped world" rift in the current international
regulation of climate change.6 9 However, the theory continues to discuss
the potential reality of "orphan shares," which occur when a sovereign does
not take responsibility for its share of liability to reduce carbon emissions.70
These orphan shares would not be positioning sovereigns to take more than
their share in the initial stages, but the theory creates a principle of
inexcusability of orphan shares, in part or whole, and any significant
' Id. at 118; See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 145, 248-53 (discussing the common law's
ability to adapt to changing circumstances and how a declaratory judgment is the foundation for
Nature's Trust remedies).
6s Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 121.
' Id. at 109; See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 111 (1992), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Cf. Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 335-
342.
6 Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 109; See generally David Takacs, The Public
Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 711 (2008) (discussing various approaches to environmental human rights, as an
expansion of the PTD, and how other nations have dealt with this issue).
" Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 111.
69 Id. at 112.
70 Id. at 113.
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orphan share "is likely to defeat efforts to reduce emissions adequately in
the short time frame needed."71
Once a nation has been successfully transitioned to accepting its
atmospheric fiduciary obligation, then actions may be "brought by one
sovereign trustee against another for failure to maintain common property"
as an effort to ensure compliance between sovereign nations. This is
because governments' approach to climate change has been "perceived as a
matter of political discretion, not obligation" and in order to accomplish the
goals of ATL there will need to be a significant shift in societal emphasis in
"moral, political, spiritual, economic, and legal framework." 73
II. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND
ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION
To evaluate the ATL theory's prospects for success, case law that
has developed in and around the question of PTD and climate change must
be considered.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Illinois Central Railroad Company is the seminal case on the issue
of what a government can and cannot do in relation to lands that are subject
to the PTD and the inalienability rule that locks resources into public
ownership. In Illinois Central, at issue was the controversy regarding the
"control of the bed of Lake Michigan east of downtown Chicago."75 There
were various entities clamoring to establish their claim of controlling
interest so the Court would grant them the title to the lands on which the
lakefront of Chicago, which was formerly lakebed but now is currently
occupied by railroad tracks among other structures to which the railroad
71 Id.
7 Id. at 114; See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 226-27 (discussing the capability of a
sovereign to pursue action against another sovereign for committing waste of an asset in the
Nature's Trust).
Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43, at 123; See generally Randall S. Abate, Climate
Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Artic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for
Enforceable International Environmental Human Rights, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Anne
C. Dowling, "Un-Locke-ing" a "Just Right" Environmental Regime: Overcoming the Three
Bears of International Environmentalism -Sovereignty, Locke, And Compensation, 26 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 891 (2002).
74 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine:
What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004) (hereinafter
American Public Trust); See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 320-23 (discussing the public
trust property and restraints on privatization).
7s American Public Trust, supra note 74, at 800.
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claims title.76 In 1851, the Illinois legislature granted certain lands, subject
to a previous act of Congress, to the railroad company for the purpose of
creating a railroad that would serve as a "public highway for the use of the
government of the United States" and also serve the State of Illinois and
City of Chicago. However, the issue arose due to the railroad company
constructing the railroad on land that was reclaimed from the waters of
Lake Michigan, without acquisition of those lands beyond those granted by
an ordinance from the City of Chicago and the act of the State
Legislature. 8 In 1873, the State Legislature repealed the grant of the land to
the Illinois Central Railroad Company in order to use the land for a more
modern purpose.79
In discussing the grant of the bed of Lake Michigan to the railroad
company, the Court discussed the importance of the harbor of Chicago to
the people of the State of Illinois and asserted that "depriving the state of
control... and plac[ing] the same in the hands of a private corporation... is a
proposition that cannot be defended."o The character of the property is one
of a public nature that is held "by the whole of the people for purposes in
which the whole people are interested."1 The submerged land is "held by
the people of the state in trust for the common use... "82 The Court reasoned
that "the state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them ...
without impairment of the public interest... than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace. "83
The Court determined that the State Legislature had acted in a
manner analogous to licensing when the original grant was provided to the
railroad to develop the land, which was in the public's interest, and that by
repealing the grant the Legislature had in essence terminated the license
16 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 433 (discussing how the lands were attributed to the State of
Illinois upon their admittance to the union and that as a matter of law "lands covered by
tidewaters" are under the ownership of the State); See generally State v. Central Vt. Ry. 571 A.2d
1128 (Vt. 1989) (analogizing the Railway's land as fee simple subject to condition subsequent,
which was a restriction that the land be use for public purposes); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979) (holding that Lewis Wharf statutes gave grantees
title to land below low water mark in fee simple, but subject to conditions subsequent that it be
used for the public purpose for which it was granted).
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435-445.
Id. at 445.
The Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine at 905-912.
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454.
sId. at 456.
8 Id. at 459.
Id. at 452-3.
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previously granted.8 4 The Court noted that as "a grant of all the lands under
the navigable waters of a state has never been adjudged to be within the
legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not
absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation."
The issue in National Audubon revolved around a grant by the
Division of Water Resources of the State of California for the City of Los
Angeles to divert certain streams of water that fed into Mono Lake.8 6 The
diversion resulted in a drop in water level in Mono Lake, which supported
a wide array of wildlife.17 The case presented a dichotomy between the
PTD and the "appropriative water rights system which since the days of the
gold rush has dominated California water law."""
The court reviewed the foundations of the PTD. The purpose of the
PTD was determined to have been originally based in "navigation,
commerce and fisheries" then expanded in California to include additional
recreational uses.8 9 The court reasoned that Mono Lake was a navigable
waterway or at a minimum, it is a fishery thus subject to protection under
the PTD. 90 The scope of the trust was an analysis limited to those
traditional lands subjected to the trust and those, like Mono Lake, which
have been included under a more expanded view of "navigable
waterways."91
The final stage of the analysis was to consider the State's duties
and powers as trustee. The court emphasized that "parties acquiring rights
in trust property generally hold those rights subject to the trust, and can
assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust. "92
The court cited to the Illinois Central case for determining whether the
State had acted within their duties and powers as the trustee or if they had
acted more in a manner akin to the Illinois Legislature. 93 The court
determined that the PTD requires the use of "public properties for public
' Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 460-463 (rejecting Illinois Central Railroad's argument that the
lands had been actually conveyed rather than having received the equivalent of a license).
8 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 460-63 (The decision put the two grants of the State Legislature
at odds, one which championed the public interest and one that seemingly violated the public
interest, and so the repeal operated to terminate the latter).
86 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419 (1983).
8 Id.
Id. at 426.
8
Id. at 434.
" Id.
91 Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 33 Cal.3d at 435 (discussing two state decisions in which the actions of a
party had impacted public trust land and reasoning that "the public trust doctrine, as recognized
and developed in California decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion
of nonnavigable tributaries").
9 Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 33 Cal.3d at 437.
9 Id. at 437-38.
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purposes" and there is a duty on the State, as trustee, to "protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust."94
In reviewing the relationship between the PTD and the California
water right system, the court concluded that each of the systems of
management "would occupy the field of allocation of stream waters to the
exclusion of any competing system of legal thought."9 5 The court reasoned
that the mutual exclusivity of these two systems was not compatible with
our legal system, which necessitated a compromise that would integrate the
two.96
The court held that the State has the right to exercise dominion
over the navigable waters, including lands beneath them, but that when
considering uses of the waterways or uses that would impact them, the
State has "as affirmative duty to take the public trust into account." 97 In so
holding, the court sought to infuse the two regimes to "clear away the legal
barriers" and enable the State to take "a new and objective look at the water
resources of Mono Basin" while protecting "human and environmental uses
of Mono Lake" because "such uses should not be destroyed because the
state mistakenly thought itself powerless to protect them." 98
B. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION EVOLUTION
1. Massachusetts v. EPA
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court reviewed a claim by
the State of Massachusetts for harms due to climate change because the
EPA had denied a petition to begin regulating the emissions of carbon
dioxide, as a pollutant, from new automobiles.99 The case largely revolves
around the issue of standing, in particular whether under the Lujan standard
there is a demonstrated "concrete and particularized injury that is either
actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and
9 4 Id. at 440-41.
9 Id. at 445.
96 id.
' Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal.3d at 445-47.
9 Id. at 452.
' Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); See also Washington Environmental Council v.
Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) infra Part III(b)(1) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
narrowing of the standing test announced in Massachusetts v. EPA; Cf Randall S. Abate,
Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate Change Litigation
and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REv. 121 (2008) (discussing the impacts of
Massachusetts v. EPA on standing in environmental jurisprudence).
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that it is likely a favorable decision will redress that injury." 00 The Court
reasoned that the litigant was vested with a procedural right as a result of
42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), which grants judicial review to challenge agency
action.101 The Court looked to State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. to
reason that Massachusetts, like Georgia, had a vested interest in the
outcome of the case sufficient "to warranty the exercise of federal judicial
power" and that Massachusetts' interest in "protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests" entitled it to "special solicitude in our standing analysis."10 2
The harm alleged by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was one
where the rise of sea levels due to global warming would precipitate a
sufficient loss of coastal property because the Commonwealth "owns a
substantial portion of the state's coastal property. "103 This potential loss of
land gives rise to the possibility that the EPA may exercise its rulemaking
authority to limit greenhouse gas emissions to curtail the extent of the
harm. 104
2. Public Nuisance
In pursuing claims for climate change, the issue of regulation is
often seen as both a positive and a negative, but in the American Electric
Power Company case the issue of federal regulation served as a bar to a
common law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions.105 The
Court addressed the issue by looking at (1) the availability of a federal
common law right, (2) whether congressional action on a question
previously at issue under federal common law removes a need for it to be
addressed, and (3) when there is federal regulation on point, whether the
10 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517.
101 Id.
10' Id. at 519-20; See generally Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)
(discussing the State of Georgia pursuing a claim against the Tennessee Copper Co. for the
"[discharge] of noxious gas from their works in Tennessee over [Georgia's] territory." The Court
reasoned that the State had an interest "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all
the earth and air within its domain." The Court also reasoned that "it is fair and reasonable
demand" by the State of Georgia, or any other sovereign, "that the air over its territory should not
be polluted ... by acts of persons beyond its control." The Court concurred with the assertion by
the State of Georgia that the pollution generated by the Tennessee Copper Co. was impacting the
lands that they sovereignly held, which is similar to the public trust albeit navigable waters were
not implicated explicitly, and that the State was entitled to their relief until the Tennessee Copper
Company could complete their new structures).
103 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523.
10 Id. at 526.
10 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); See also James W. Shelson, The
Misuse of Public Nuisance Law to Address Climate Change, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 195, 205-09
(2011) (hereinafter Misuse of Public Nuisance).
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resulting government entity's inaction in regulating the particular cause of
action does not result in displacement. 106
The Court determined that there was indeed federal common law
and a right to pursue a claim, if the subject is one of national concern. 107
The Court cited to a prior case that stated "air and water in their ambient or
interstate aspects" do give rise to a claim under federal common law.108
However, the availability of a federal common law claim is "an academic
question" because of the presence of the "Clean Air Act and the EPA
actions the Act authorizes. "109
The implementation of displacement depends on whether Congress
has addressed "a question previously governed by a decision that rested on
federal common law" and if it has addressed that then "the need for such an
unusual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears."110 The
threshold test is not subject to the same level of scrutiny that a state law
may be; the Court stated that "legislative displacement of federal common
law does not require the 'same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest
[congressional] purpose."'" The Court held that "the Clean Air Act and
the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
plants."112
The EPA is free to seek any of its authorized methods of
enforcement and when it has not "set emission limits for a particular
pollutant or source of pollution, States and private parties may petition for a
rulemaking on the matter." 113 The plaintiffs had argued that if the EPA
actually exercised its authority then the displacement would occur, and if it
had not actually exercised its authority, then no displacement would
occur. 114 The Court stated that "the Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of
the legislature's 'considered judgment' concerning the regulation of air
pollution because it permits emissions until EPA acts."115 The result is that
the EPA has been delegated the power of regulate CO2 emissions from
power plants, which displaces the ability of a party to seek enforcement
through litigation. 116
10" Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2530.
10 Id.
0 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2530.
109 Id. at 2537.
110 Id.
111 See supra note 109.
112 Id.
113 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
114 Id.
11s Id. at 2538 (considering the issue of deternining whether the inaction by the EPA changed the
legislative intent to displace based on prior case law).
116 Cool Lawsuits, supra note 51, at 55.
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The Court ultimately concluded that plaintiff's state law action
depended on the preemptive effect of the federal act, where the Clean Air
Act displaced a federal common law cause of action based on the holding
of International Paper Co. v. Ouellette. 117
In Comer, plaintiffs asserted claims for private nuisance due to the
defendant's release of "by-products that led to the development and
increase of global warming, which produced the conditions that formed
Hurricane Katrina, which damaged their property."11. The District Court
ultimately rejected their claim based primarily on res judicata, the lack of
standing for the plaintiffs, the political question doctrine, and displacement
by the Clean Air Act.119 The plaintiffs appealed the decision to Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling on the basis of
res judicata. 120
In the lower court decision, the main issues of relevance here are
standing, political question and displacement. 12 The focus issue of the
standing was on causation. 122 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs'
assertions of causation, when viewed in the context of the EPA's findings
on greenhouse gases, "does not in and of itself support the contention that
the plaintiffs' property damage is fairly traceable to the defendants'
emissions. "123 This contribution, or lack thereof, meant that the plaintiffs'
allegations of contribution "to the kinds of injuries that they suffered" were
insufficient for standing and represented only part of the required
elements. 124 Ultimately, standing was denied because the burden of proving
standing resides with the plaintiffs, whose alleged injuries were more
difficult to prove than those in Massachusetts v. EPA or American Electric
Power Co. due to their tenuous nature as pled. 125
The court briefly reviewed the political question doctrine in light of
the plaintiff's prayer for relief and assertions of causal link between the
... Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481,488 (1987)); See also Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216,2013 WL 4418637
*1 (3rd Cir. August 20, 2013) infra Part III.C.
118 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (2012); See also Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460 (2013); Misuse of Public Nuisance, supra note 105, at 209-12.
119 Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
1"0 Comer, 718 F.3d at 460.
... See supra note 118.
122 Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (citing Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,
563, F.3d 466,478 (2009)); See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517; See generally
Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1131.
113 Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 860-61.
124 Id. at 861.
1" Id. at 861-62 (citing the court's decision in the prior Comer case disallowing "discovery that
will likely cost millions of dollars, when the tenuous nature of the causation alleged is readily
apparent at the pleadings stage of litigation").
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release of defendants' by-products and an increase in global warming. 126
However, the plaintiffs contended that their prayer for relief was not
"asking [the] court to regulate emissions or to make policy determinations
concerning climate change" but the court cited portions of the plaintiff's
complaint that meant the court would have to "determine that the
defendants' levels of emissions are 'unreasonable.' "127
The court also ruled that the plaintiffs' claim was displaced by the
Clean Air Act, citing to Am. Elec. Power Co. where the plaintiffs similarly
requested relief relating to the emissions by the defendants and the court's
need to make a determination as to the reasonableness of those
emissions.
The State of California has been at the forefront of global warming
and PTD cases as seen in National Audubon. 12 9 However, courts have
occasionally transitioned from injunctive relief to damages for causes of
action under a theory of climate change 1 30 and the Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. case is illustrative of that dilemma. 131
In Kivalina, the Village of Kivalina is the governing body for the
approximately 400 Eskimo villagers who reside in the City of Kivalina. 13 2
The villagers have asserted a claim based on the increased temperatures as
a result of global warming reducing the amount of Arctic sea ice that
protects the coastline and resulting in erosion and destruction forcing the
relocation of the villagers. 133 The court was presented with a claim of
common law nuisance by a request for relief that is neither injunctive nor
monetary damages, but an estimated requirement of "$95 million to $400
million" and various requests for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6). 134
116 Id. at 862.
12. Id. at 864.
12. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 865; See also California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755
MUJ, 2007 WL 2726871 *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (discussing the claim by the State of
California against a group of automobile manufacturers in which they sought damages rather than
an injunction, which is a notable departure from prior cases in climate change litigation, but
ultimately the Court held that "it cannot adjudicate Plaintiffs federal common law global
warming nuisance tort claim without making an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion."); Misuse of Public Nuisance, supra note 105, at 212-13 (discussing
California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at *1).
1"9 See supra note 88.
130 See generally California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at *1; Misuse ofPublic
Nuisance, supra note 105, at 212-13.
131 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (2009); Misuse of
Public Nuisance, supra note 105, at 213-15.
13' Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
133 Id. at 865.
134 Id. at 870.
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The court evaluated the plaintiff's standing and the defendants
argued that the matter at issue should be dismissed on political question
doctrine and standing grounds. 135 The court primarily reviewed the political
question doctrine because "the Supreme Court has indicated that disputes
involving political questions lie outside of the Article III jurisdiction of
federal courts." 13 6 The court reiterated the Baker v. Carr test for political
question and summarized it into three groupings. 13 7
The court reviewed each of the six tests outlined in Baker v. Carr,
starting with textual commitment.138 The textual commitment test is one
where "the Constitution has given one of the political branches final
responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature of such a power." 139 The
defendants had argued that the case violated the first test because of the
global nature of the harm and the Constitution's textual commitment of
foreign relations to the executive branch. 14 0 The court cited two cases for
the propositions that "the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign
policy is political, not judicial" although "Baker cautioned against
'sweeping statements' that imply all questions involving foreign relations
are political ones. "141 The court determined that while the "indisputably
international dimension of this particular environmental problem does not
render the instant controversy a non-justiciable one... global warming
issues may implicate foreign policy and related economic issues, and the
fact that this case 'touches foreign relations' does not ipso facto place it
beyond the reach of the judiciary. "142
The second and third prongs under the Baker test can be lumped
together when the court reviewed the "well-settled principles of tort and
public nuisance law," as applicable, but reasoned that these principles
would not provide guidance here since the current court is "not so
sanguine" as the Supreme Court when deciding Am. Elec. Power Co.1 43 In
fact, the court further reasoned that "the harm from global warming
involves a series of events disconnected from the discharge itself" and the
liability and damages extending from such an attenuated chain of causation
is "on a scale unlike any prior environmental pollution case cited by the
Plaintiffs" thus the second test precluded judicial consideration.
13 Id. at 870.
136 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
131 Id. at 871-72.
138 Id. at 872.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 872-73.
141 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
142 Id. at 873.
143 Id. at 875.
144 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
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The court evaluated the plaintiffs' Article III standing and
concluded that plaintiffs had not alleged a valid injury.145 The plaintiffs
assert, "[T]hey need only allege that defendants 'contributed' to their
injuries" and concede, "they are unable to trace their alleged injuries to any
particular defendant. "146 The basis for this assertion is from the context of
the Clean Water Act for contribution principles, but the court rejects that
this does not preclude the party from the injury requirements in a common
law nuisance claim, which is substantially distinguishable from a statutory
water pollution claim.1 47 The plaintiffs further contended that they were
entitled to receive "special solicitude" treatment for Article III standing
similar to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA. 14 8
However, the court rejected that argument based on the fact that the
plaintiffs are not "seeking to enforce any procedural rights concerning an
agency's rulemaking authority" but rather their "claim is one for damages
directed against a variety of private entities. "149
The court's holding was that the "plaintiffs' federal claim for
nuisance is barred by the political question doctrine and for lack of
standing under Article II."s150 The plaintiffs appealed the case to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had
properly rejected the claim by the Village of Kivalina, concluding that the
Clean Air Act displaced a federal common law claim for public nuisance as
seen in Am. Elec. Power Co. and Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station.151
3. Atmospheric Trust Litigation Cases152
Thus far, there are have been several notable cases brought in state
courts under the Atmospheric Trust Litigation theory, which will be
reviewed briefly.
In Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, the Nation's first ATL case
"to be heard on its merits," was argued in 2012. 153 However, the case was
145 Id. at 878.
1" Id.; See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
14 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 879-80.
14" Id. at 882.
149 Id 
.
1 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
s Id. at 858 (citing Supreme Court precedent that "the type of remedy asserted is not relevant to
the applicability of the doctrine of displacement."); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 2013
WL 4418637 at *1 infra Part III.C.
1s See also Barhaugh v. State, 264 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2011); Amy Poehling Eddy, The Climate
Petition and the Public Trust Doctrine, 36-Aug. MONT. LAW. 6 (2011) (discussing the efforts by
petitioners seeking to have the State of Montana adopt regulations to curb GHG emissions and the
denial & dismissing that resulted); States with Active Lawsuits, OUR CHILDREN's TRUST,
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/US/LawsuitStates (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
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subsequently appealed due to the dismissal under Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).154 The plaintiffs' complaint sought relief "on the basis
of the PTD" by requesting that the court declare "atmosphere is a public
trust asset" and "defendants have a fiduciary obligation as trustees to take
affirmative action to preserve the atmosphere and other trust assets from
impacts associated with climate change." 155 On appeal, the plaintiffs
amended the complaint to solely address "whether the [PTD] in Arizona
includes the atmosphere." 156
The plaintiffs allegations involve "state inaction," which is not
alleged to have been a violation of "any specific constitutional provision on
which relief can be granted."157 The relevant cases in Arizona's PTD
jurisprudence also "do not provide a constitutional basis for [the plaintiff's]
challenge because [they] do not assert that the state improperly disposed of
a public trust resource. 158 Ultimately, the plaintiff did not assert any
"constitutional provision from which we may derive the public trust
protections and remedy [they urge]." 159 The court could not "order the
defendants to take actions in violation of a statute unless we determine the
statute is unconstitutional" thus "[b]ecause we determine that relief cannot
be granted, [plaintiff] is essentially requesting us to issue an advisory
opinion which we will not do."160
A second ATL case was filed by Gloria dei Filippone, who is a
minor, through her mother Maria Filippone against the Iowa Department of
Natural Resources. 161 The lawsuit was filed as result of the denial of "a
petition for rulemaking pursuant to Iowa Code §17A.7(1)" by Kids vs.
Global Warming and specifically requested that the Department of Natural
Resources ("DNR") "adopt new rules restricting greenhouse gas
1s3 Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209 *1 (March 14,
2013); See also Julie Cart, Judge sides with New Mexico in Atmospheric Trust Litigation case,
Los ANGELES TiMEs (June 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/26/science/la-sci-sn-
climate-change-lawsuit-20130626; Cf. Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 153.
154 Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209 1 (March 14,
2013).
1 Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209 at 1.
1s6 Id. at 2.
1 Id. at 7.
18 Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209 at *7 (citing Arizona Center for Law in Public Interest v. Hassell,
837 P.2d 158 (1991) and San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa,
972 P.2d 179 (1999)).
1
9 
Id.
160 Id at 8.
161 See generally Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. Iowa Dept. of Natural Resources, 829 N.W.2d 589
(2013).
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emissions. "162 The DNR denied the petition because it "anticipated the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will likely be creating new
standards, which might be inconsistent with the proposed rules in violation
of Iowa Code §455B. 133(4).",163 The DNR also cited that "adopting the
proposed rules would require resources and funding to be designated to the
program, and that without additional legislatively-appropriated funding, it
would be unable to develop and administer the proposed rules." 164 The
District Court held that DNR's denial was not "unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion" and the court "declined Filippone's
invitation to expand the public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere." 165
On appeal, the court considered three issues: the Inalienable Rights
Clause, PTD, and Fair Consideration. 16 6 The Inalienable Rights Clause,
asserts a claim that provides a "right to a life-sustaining atmosphere." 167
However, Filippone failed to assert this issue before the District Court,
which constrained the Court of Appeals from considering the. 168
The second issue is the PTD and Filippone's request that the DNR
"must consider new rules regarding greenhouse gas emissions because the
PTD applies to the atmosphere." 169 The court noted that the PTD in Iowa is
one that "limits the State's power to dispose of land encompassed within
the public trust and is 'based on the notion that the public possesses
inviolable rights to certain natural resources.' "170 However, the court also
noted "the public trust doctrine in Iowa has a narrow scope" and that the
Supreme Court of Iowa does not "necessarily subscribe to broad
applications of the doctrine, noted by one authority to include rural
parklands, historic battlefields, or archaeological remains. In fact, we are
cautioned against an overextension of the doctrine." 17 The limited scope of
the PTD resulted in the DNR not having "a duty under the public trust
doctrine to restrict greenhouse gases to protect the atmosphere." 172
16' Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 1; See generally Iowa / Our Children's Trust, OUR CHILDREN'S
TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/state/Iowa (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
163 Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 1.
164 Id.
16s Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 1.
166 Id. at 2-3.
16' Id. at 2.
16 Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 2.
169 Id.
170 Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 2.
171 Id. at 2 (citing Fenci v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Iowa 2000) and State v.
Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Iowa 1989) to support the propositions of limited scope for the
Iowan Public Trust Doctrine); See also Bushby v. Wash. Cnty. Conservation Bd., 654 N.W.2d
494, 498 (Iowa 2002) (noting a cite by the Court to a prior decision where "our supreme court
declined to extend the doctrine to cover forested areas").
17' Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 3.
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Therefore, the court concluded that the DNR's denial of the proposed rule
was not unreasonable. 173
The final issue of fair consideration involves the DNR's duty to
"give fair consideration to the petition for rulemaking." 174 The Iowan
standard is that "an agency give fair consideration to the propriety of
issuing the proposed rule" and "it does not require the agency to take a
stand on the substantive issues that might prompt the proposal of a rule."175
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court conclusion that the DNR
gave fair consideration to the rulemaking petition noting that the "denial of
the petition was not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. 176
The third ATL case for discussion is Angela Bonser-Lain, et al. v.
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. 177 Similar to Filippone,
Bonser-Lain case involved a petition for rulemaking.17" Here, the petition
had been submitted to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality to
develop a plan that would reduce carbon-dioxide emissions within the state
by six percent per year. 179 The court reviewed the petition for rulemaking,
which had been denied on ground that the Texas PTD was "exclusively
limited to the conservation of water" and that the Commission was
"prohibited from protecting the air quality because of the federal
requirements of the Federal Clean Air Act."180
In reviewing the Commission' s rationale for denying the petition
for rulemaking, the court determined that the PTD differed from the
traditional common law limitation to the conservation of water, but rather
the Texas Constitution required "preservation and conservation of all of the
natural resources of this State."8 The court further reviewed the second
rationale of the Commission and held that the Texas Clean Air Act
mandated the protection of air quality by citing to Tex. Health & Safety
173 Id.
174 Id.
17s Id. (citing Cmty. Action Research Grp. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 217,
220 (Iowa 1979), which reviewed the standard under Iowa Code § 17A.7 for an agency's review
of a petition for rulemaking).
176 Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 3.
17 Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194,2012 WL 3164561
*1 (Tex. Dist. Aug. 2, 2012); See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 153.
178 Compl. at 2, Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 2011 WL 8202306 *1 (Tex. Dist.
July 21, 2011); See generally Br. of Appellees, Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality,
2012 WL 3164561 *1 (Tex. Dist. Aug. 2, 2012).
17 Id.
18o Bonser-Lain v. Texas Comm'n on Environmental Quality, No. D-1 -GN- 11-002194, 2012 WL
2946041, at *1 (Tex. Dist. Ct., July 9, 2012).
181 See Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561 at *1 (citing Texas Const. Art. XVI, § 59, which provides
the range of resources to be protected).
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Code Ann. § 382.002, which requires "safeguard[ing] the state's air
resources from pollution by controlling or abating air pollution and
emissions of air contaminants." 182 The court ultimately denied the
Defendant's Plea for Jurisdiction because the Texas Constitution expanded
the scope of the PTD beyond the traditional conservation of water and that
the Clean Air Act did not prohibit a State from establishing more stringent
rules. 183
III. PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
BASED ON NUISANCE FRAMEWORK
This portion of the article will focus on two main points. First is an
analysis of the ATL theory when argued on the common law basis for the
PTD. This includes claims regarding navigable water ways or related
resources, and nuisance claims accounting for permissible claims involving
an air-related injury. Second, even if ATL is determined to be viable for the
PTD fiduciary breaches, the claims should fail for justiciability concerns.
A. ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION IS BEYOND THE INTENDED SCOPE
OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
1. The Doctrine Traditionally Has Been Limited to Navigable
Waterways or Related Resources
The PTD, as created and modified in American jurisprudence, has
remained primarily focused on the issues relating to and regarding the use
of navigable water. 184 In fact, it has been argued that the very basis for the
famous Justinian Institutes quotation regarding the "common property of
all" was "likely reflecting less the true nature of public rights during the
Roman Empire than Justinian's own idealization of a legal regime."1 "5 The
basis for the PTD really found its footing in Illinois Central, which was
decided based on a theory of Public Trust. 186 The Illinois Central case sets
18 Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561 at *2.
183 Id.
184 Changing Conceptions, supra note 31, at 633-38 (discussion of the origins of the Public Trust
Doctrine); See generally Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal.3d at 435.
18 Id. at 635 (Footnote 12 includes a discussion of the origins of the famous Justinian Institutes
quotation, the actuality of a Public Trust Doctrine operating in fact during the Roman Empire, and
distinguishes the possibility of that Doctrine with Roman practice of conveying rights for the
purpose of exploitation).
s" American Public Trust, supra note 74, at 926 (citing "What is less clear is why Justice Field
felt compelled to reach for the blunderbuss of the public trust doctrine to defeat the Illinois
Central's vested-rights claim, rather than a more fact-specific argument, such as Justice Harlan's
characterization of the grant of the outer harbor as a revocable license").
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forth the basis for the disposition of Public Trust assets by the Trustee-in
that case it was the State legislature attempting to dispose of assets, and
also as much about how the Trustee may use the lands subject to the Public
Trust to improve the utility for "whole of the people."18 7
The restriction set forth by Illinois Central raises the issue of what
lands are actually subject to the Public Trust doctrine.""' Arnold v. Mundy, a
19th century New Jersey case, is a good starting point for defining the
types of lands subject to the Public Trust as it predates both Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee and Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan.18 9 In Arnold, the court
defined the types of land common to "whole of the people" of New Jersey:
Navigable rivers, the ports, bays, coasts of the sea for the purposes of
passing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all other uses of the
water or its products.1 90 The basis for the property rights derived from a
grant from the King of England to the "duke of York... in which the rivers,
ports, bays, and coasts were a part, passed to the duke of York, ...
exercising the royal authority."1 91 The State of New Jersey, including the
whole of the people, succeeded to "all of those royal rights" as a result of
the Revolution. 192 The Supreme Court recognized this in Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee and further stated that the Duke of York's grant was
"held by the king in his public and regal character, as the representative of
the nation; and in trust for them." 193 The Court further held that "the people
of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character, held the
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soil under them; for
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
constitution to the general government." 194 The Supreme Court in Pollard
referenced the proposition from holding of Martin v. Waddell's Lessee that
the lands subject to the PTD remain an issue of the states by stating "[t]he
shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by
the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states
respectively; and the new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and
18 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387; See also American Public Trust, supra note
74, at 929-930.
18 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387.
189 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821); See generally Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41
U.S. 367 (1842) (A New Jersey action reviewing the "State rights in tide-waters"); See generally
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (discussing the nature of navigable waterways in
relation to the State of Alabama's admittance into the Union).
9 Id.
191 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 1 (emphasis added).
192 Id.
193 Martin, 41 U.S. at 367.
194 Id. (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction over this subject as the original states." 195 Thus, navigable
waters and related lands are subject to the State's definition of the PTD that
the State must use in a manner consistent with their duties under the
doctrine. 196
This progression of cases, when coupled with Illinois Central,
clearly establishes a common law traditional jurisprudence linking the PTD
to lands related to navigable waters. 197 When this basis is added to the
limitation in absolute title imposed upon the King of England by holding
title "only for the benefit of the public" this means that the states could
"enjoy no greater title" than what the King of England held.198
Expansion of the PTD must be limited when defining scope of the
resources as those "extending to 'property of a special character' and of
'public concern to the whole people of the state'" as laid out by Illinois
Central.1 99 The court in National Audubon Society faced the dilemma over
whether the Mono Lake tributary streams qualified as navigable waters.200
It reasoned that while the streams did not qualify themselves as navigable
waterways, the disruptions of the streams caused a drop in the water levels
of Mono Lake, which is navigable water, and thus could be managed under
the PTD.201
An examination of the holding in PPL Montana, LLC. v. Montana
addressed what the "contours of the public trust" are and upon what they
depend.202 The Court stated that the public trust does not rely on the
Constitution to define its scope but rather "[u]nder accepted principles of
federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the scope of the
public trust over waters within their borders. "203 This principle has been
demonstrated in the course of litigation sought under the theory of ATL:
where the State has expanded the contours of the public trust, the results
have been different from states in which there has been no change. 2 04
19 Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. at 212.
1" Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 21 (2011).
19 See supra note 241.
198 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction &
Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 58 (2006) (hereinafter Conservative
Reconstruction).
19 Id. at 59 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454-55).
See generally Nat' Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 419; Conservative Reconstruction, supra note
196, at 59-63.
201 Id.
202 PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234-35 (2012) (holding that the State of Montana
did not hold title, under the equal footing doctrine, to riverbeds that were under segments of rivers
that were non-navigable at the time of entry into the Union).
203 PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234-35 (2012).
2 Compare Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 589, with Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561 at *1;
However, also see Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209 at * 1; Barhaugh,
361 Mont. at 1.
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2. Air, When Used, Was the Result of a Nuisance Claim Outside the
Scope of the Trust
Judicial expansion of the PTD has generally eschewed expanding
the trust to include the atmosphere, even though the air has been the basis
of litigation, and "judicial expansion has not been one to impose the
common law public trust to resources other than navigable waters." 205 The
holding in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. provides insight into that
reluctance when the Court focused not on the fact that pollution was caused
by the sulphurous acid gas but instead on the "domestic destruction they
have suffered." 206 The Court reasoned that the "wholesale destruction of
forests, orchards, and crops" caused by the defendant's use of their land to
process ore in a manner that "the tall chimneys in present use cause the
poisonous gases to be carried to greater distances" was sufficient to
establish "there is no alternative to issuing an injunction." 207
The expansion of the public trust to include the atmosphere could
potentially introduce the argument (by analogy) that the waterways were
the ancient "public highway" and the air is the more modern "public
highway" based on the holding in United States v. Causby, where the Court
stated "[t]he navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public
domain .... "20s The Court subsequently stated that the "[t]he airspace, apart
from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain"
for the questions of whether flights over Causby's property constituted a
potential taking in the case. 209 However, the situation in Causby is
distinguishable from that of an ATL where the issue is primarily centered
on global warming as opposed to the mere trespassory nature of overflights
where "invasions of [air] are in the same category as invasions of the
[land]." 2 10
In the case of an argument by analogy to wildlife or game, using
District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. or Geer v. Connecticut as a basis,
the analogy would be distinguishable from the basis of these decisions
under parens patriae rather than the PTD per se. In Air Florida, the
SIs the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 26 (citing to Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251 (1971)).
Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238-39.
0 Id at 239.
08 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263-64 (1946) (discussing the relevant limits to a
property owner's use and enjoyment of their property and contrasting the ancient tradition where
the upper limit was the "periphery of the universe").
'09 Id. at 266.
10 Causby, 328 U.S. at 265.
... See generally Geer, 161 U.S. at 519; Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d at 1077; Marks, 6 Cal.3d at 251;
Cf. Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The Public Trust Doctrine and Sustainable
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Court held that the defendant was liable under the PTD. The river, which
is a navigable waterway under the PTD, provided the Court a basis to find
that Air Florida owed a duty of care regarding the river, which was
breached by the crash. 13 California has been a leader in the area of
environmental litigation related to the public trust lands, but even it
distinguishes between "common law public trust applicable to navigable
waters and a public trust that arises from a statute that specifically provides
that fish or wildlife are held in trust for the people and are regulated by a
state agency pursuant to a specific statute." 2 14 Additionally, the regulation
of wild animals and their state-based ownership has been removed from
this analogy since the United States Supreme Court has also overruled
Geer.
The final word on whether an analogy argument can be made or if
the air is even subject to being classified as a part of the public trust may
have been given when the Supreme Court addressed the issue of GHG
emissions in American Electric Power.216 The Court acknowledged the
limited applicability of "federal common law when dealing 'with air and
water in their ambient or interstate aspects' in light of the existence of the
[Clean Air Act]." In Am. Elec. Power Co., the Court stated that
Congressional acts "installed an all-encompassing regulatory program,
supervised by an expert administrative agency," in this case the EPA, to
deal with pollution.2 8 Thus, categorizing air as a component of the public
trust may fall into a group of claims that are non-justiciable even if the air
or atmosphere were to be included at common law.219
Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 322 (2006). Contra
Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 146-47.
.12 Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d at 1078.
213 Id.
214 IS the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 26.
21s Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (stating "Geer v. Connecticut ... is overruled. Time
has revealed the error of the result reached in Geer through its application of the 19th century
legal fiction of state ownership of wild animals. Challenges under the Commerce Clause to state
regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to
state regulations of other natural resources').
216 Is the Public Trust, supra note 15, at 26.
217 Id.
21' Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
211 Id (stating, "[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested
on federal common law, the need for such an unusual exercise of law -making by federal courts
disappears."Milwaukee I, 451 U.S., at 314, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (holding that amendments to the
Clean Water Act displaced the nuisance claim recognized in Milwaukee I).
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B. ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION, IF VIABLE, FAILS FOR
JUSTICIABILITY CONCERNS
In the event that ATL is found to be a viable expansion of the PTD,
the next set of hurdles that the litigants must overcome is that laid out in
Article III concerning standing and non-violation of the political question
doctrine.220
1. Standing
In order to address Standing in this instance, we must look to Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife. This case articulates the three-part test for
standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
The standing requirement was a large portion of the decision in
Lujan because the plaintiffs alleged that the actions of the Secretaries of the
Interior and Commerce in regards to foreign nations would violate the
Endangered Species Act of 1973. The Court reviewed the alleged harm
by the plaintiffs and in the standing analysis found that in order to invoke
federal jurisdiction.223 The Court stated a test for standing that required the
plaintiff carry the "burden of showing standing by establishing, inter alia,
that they have suffered an injury in fact, i.e., a concrete and particularized,
actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest."224 The plaintiff
must also be able to demonstrate a "causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of -the injury has to be 'fairly ... trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not.. th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court. '225 The third
prong of the test is that there must be redressability or the prospect that the
Court will grant "must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative.'
2 26
"0 U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (The requirement that in order for judicial power to be available,
the issue before the Court must involve "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution" or "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party").
.1 See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555-6.
224 Id.; See also Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,352 (2006).
22s Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; See also Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1143-44 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737 n. 19 (1984), which states that "[t]he 'fairly traceable' and 'redressability' components of the
constitutional standing inquiry were initially articulated by this Court as 'two facets of a single
causation requirement."'); Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220,
1228 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2008).
6 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
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The party that invokes the jurisdiction of the federal courts is the same
party that "bears the burden of establishing these elements. "22
The Court reasoned that while the respondents established a
"special interest in the subject" by their members they did not, however,
demonstrate that they suffered any injury in fact.228 The respondents "state
purely speculative, nonconcrete injuries when they argue that suit can be
brought by anyone with an interest in studying or seeing endangered
animals anywhere on the globe and anyone with a professional interest in
such animals." 2 29 The Court also determined that the respondents not only
lacked injury, but that "failed to demonstrate redressability." 23 0 By failing
to include the agencies which granted the funding for the projects at issue,
but the Court could not grant relief requested by the respondents by order
non-parties to capitulate unless they were "bound by the Secretary's
regulation, which is very much an open question." 23 1 Ultimately, the Court
held that the respondents "lack standing to bring this action" and the Court
reversed the Court of Appeals decision stating "the Court of Appeals erred
in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States." 23 2
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the State was subjected to the standing
analysis from Lujan but also recognized that Congress had "' accorded a
procedural right to protect [their] interests" and "can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy." 233 The Court permitted the Commonwealth of Massachusetts a
"special solicitude" and reasoned that like the State of Georgia in
Tennessee Copper Co., Massachusetts should be able to assert action to
protect its quasi-sovereign rights.234 Massachusetts' burden for injury was
more easily met because the "special solicitude" permitted an aggregation
of actual or imminent injury for all of the citizens.235
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Washington Environmental Council v.
Bellon has narrowed the requirements for standing by reviewing a lower
court's ruling on the Plaintiff s action to "compel the [agencies] to regulate
[GHG] emissions from the state's five oil refineries under the [Clean Air
Act]." 23 6 In order to meet the burden under standing, the Plaintiffs were
Id.
28Id.
29Id.
230 Id. at 568.
23 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568.
See supra note 221 at 578.
2 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498-99 (2007).
234 Id. at 520 n. 17 (discussing the ruling of Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co. as one of standing).
23 Id.
3 6 Bellon,732 F.3d at 1131, 1135 (basing the review of Article III standing, despite the lack of a
challenge by the defendant, on Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009)).
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required to show an injury in fact,23 7 the causality of that injury based on
the Defendant's action,238 and redressability. 239 The court also reviewed the
Plaintiffs claim for relaxed standing requirements similar to those that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was held to, but the court distinguished
this by determining that neither the council nor its members were a
sovereign, nor did they exercise a procedural right.2 40 The Court ultimately
held that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden for Article III
standing and had not satisfied the "irreducible constitutional minimum" as
required by Lujan and thus the lower court did not have jurisdiction to rule
on the merits.241
In the ATL cases presented earlier, the plaintiffs generally alleged
that the State had not thoroughly conducted their duties under the PTD and
that as a result some harm, related to climate change, had or would injure
them if relief were not granted. The plaintiffs have also generally petitioned
the State agency responsible for environmental protection for rulemaking
related to carbon dioxide emissions prior to filing their suit. Using these as
the two steps that would be taken for a plaintiff who files a well-pled
complaint under the theory of ATL, the following is an analysis of how the
federal courts may treat the claim for standing purposes.
The first step is to determine whether the plaintiff would be able to
establish that they suffered an injury in fact that is both "concrete and
particularized." 24 2 The plaintiff would not be able to claim some exception
from normalized standing under a rule similar to what the Commonwealth
1 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1137-138 (reviewing the various claims by the plaintiffs to illustration an
injury, either currently or a risk of future harm, but since the defendants did not dispute the claims
the court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had met their burden).
3 Id. at 1138-142 (citing various cases in their review of causation, but in specificity the inability
of the plaintiffs to demonstrate causality because of the significant attenuation of the defendant's
alleged misconduct and the plaintiff's assumed injury in fact. The court's review of the alleged
misconduct required more than "vague, conclusory statements" linking the misconduct to "their
purported injuries." The court specifically noted the causal chain's "series of links strung together
by conclusory, generalized statements of 'contribution,' without any plausible scientific or other
evidentiary basis that the [defendant]'s emissions are the source of their injuries." The court
determined, through expert testimony, that the emissions were "scientifically indiscernible" and
that there was an "absence of any meaningful nexus" thus resulting in "the causal chain is too
tenuous to support standing").
1 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1143 (reasoning that the failure to meet causality is the same as a failure to
meet redressibility due to the overlap between the two based on the plaintiff's requested relief of
a court order to regulate GHG emissions by the defendants).
2
4 0 Id. at 1141-143.
241 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144.
242 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (discussing the requirement for an injury to be particularized the injury
must not be "widely shared" because otherwise "an injury that is widely shared is ipso factor not
an injury sufficient to provide the basis for judicial review" according to Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727,738 (1972)).
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of Massachusetts used because there claim is based on a procedural right
rather than substantive.243 Using the Filippone case as an example, the
plaintiff may have a very difficult time establishing an injury in fact but
likely would qualify under the denial of rulemaking exception. However,
the claim brought by Nelson Kanuk might satisfy the injury in fact
requirement since the erosion of the riverbank is both concrete and
particularized to him, at least in his relevant area, but there is the potential
that it becomes a "widely spread" injury thus void for judicial review under
the "particularized" requirement? The second part of the injury analysis is
that the injury must be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical."245 In the case of the individual without an injury in fact, then
they would fail this portion of the first step and be denied standing without
an exception for rulemaking appeals. The claim in the form of global
warming may also face challenges establishing the "actual or imminent"
requirement due to potential challenges on the reliability of the modeling
data provided by their expert witness.246 In the case of Mr. Kanuk, his
injury would most likely qualify under imminent harm unless it was shown
that there was actual erosion of his land due to the melting of the
permafrost.247
The second step of the standing analysis requires an evaluation of
the "causal connection" from the alleged injury and the defendant's
behavior and that connection must be "fairly traceable" but not the result of
some "independent action of [a] third party not before the court."248 Here,
the harm is results from the denial of rulemaking or, as in the case of
Kanuk, the alleged result of global warming due to the inaction of the State
to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions. The causal connection in the event of
a denial of rulemaking also extends to whether the body has the authority
or responsibility to regulate the atmosphere. This belongs in the discussion
of whether the PTD is amenable to expansion to include the atmosphere.
Assuming arguendo, the causal connection between the State's inaction to
a See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
m Ed Ronco, Mt. Edgecumbe Senior Sues AK Over Climate Change, ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA,
http://www.alaskapublic.org/2012/12/10/mt-edgecumbe-senior-sues-ak-over-climate-change/; See
also supra note 242.
1 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
" Alvaro Hasani, Forecasting the End of Climate Change Litigation: Why Expert Testimony
Based on Climate Models Should Not Be Admissible, 32 Miss. C. L. REV. 83, 91-94 (2013)
(discussing how the Frye and Daubert standards of expert witness testimony would both take
issue with the reliability of this type of testimony based on climate change models).
" Compare Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1131, with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555, and Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. at 497, and Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Coming Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 2d 957 (D. Oregon 2006).
' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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regulate and the harm incurred would be factually similar to Massachusetts
v. EPA and would likely qualify as fairly traceable.
The third step in the standing analysis is whether the Court can
grant relief that is redressable to the alleged injury.249 In the case of an ATL
claim, the courts certainly have demonstrated their capability to issue
injunctions to order a regulatory agency to act, such as in Massachusetts v.
EPA, or grant relief against a private entity, such as in Tennessee Copper
Co.. As for the claim by Kanuk, the remediation of the riverbank would
likely be grantable, but economic considerations may prevent the Court
from granting that type of relief because of the impracticability of the
remediation.25 o
2. Political Question Doctrine
The second hurdle that a potential ATL claim may face is that of
non-justiciability due to political question. The Political Question doctrine
is one that should be approached with care to ensure that the doctrine must
be cautiously invoked because "the mere fact that a case touches on the
political process does not necessarily create a political question beyond
courts' jurisdiction." 25 The Supreme Court has identified six tests that
independently can be used by the courts to identify the existence of a
political question in the matter before their courts.5 The six tests are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5]
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
253question.
4 9 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
See generally Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
1 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp.2d 676, 680 (2006) (citing to In re
Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D.N.J. 2001)
(citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927))).
's' Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
2s Id. at 680 (citing to Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 78, (2004) (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
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For the purposes of this article, only the first, second, and third
tests will be discussed despite potential relevance for the fourth, fifth and
sixth tests and part of the rationale is that "[t]he tests are probably listed in
descending order of both importance and certainty. "254 The other rationale
is that the Court only needs to find one of the six tests indicative of political
question for the matter to be non-justiciable.
The first test under Baker v. Carr involves direct analysis of the
Constitution to determine whether the issue at hand has been "textually
committed" to "a coordinate political department." 256 In applying the first
test to the ATL theory, the American Electric Power case provides
guidance as to the applicability a potential textual commitment by stating
that "[e]nvironmental protection is undoubtedly an area 'within national
legislative power,' one in which federal courts may fill in 'statutory
interstices,' and, if necessary, even 'fashion federal law.' 257 The Clean Air
Act was an act of Congress, as authorized by the United States
Constitution, but the Constitution does not textually commit the regulation
of carbon-dioxide emissions to the federal government. However, one of
the stated goals of the ATL theory is to create a global scheme for the
reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, which would implicate the foreign
powers' textual commitment to the Executive Branch.258 Therefore, if the
case involved that particular aspect of the theory, then the first test could
find the cause of action non-justiciable due to political question. 259
However, the issue of foreign policy is not the end of the discussion
because "the mere fact that foreign affairs may be affected by a judicial
decision does not implicate abstention." 26 0
The second test presents a dilemma for the judiciary over how to
resolve the case due to "a lack of judicial discoverable and manageable
standards." 261 This is distinguishable from Massachusetts v. EPA, because
that case provided the Court with a federal statute to interpret despite "the
Supreme Court stat[ing] that it possessed neither the expertise nor the
4 Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
Id. at 580.
" Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
s Supra note 43.
See generally Carter v. Goldwater, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (discussing the impasse between the
Congress and President Carter over the fight of the President to nullify a treaty with a foreign
power resulted in the case being dismissed out for want of ajusticiable issue).
'60 See Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 873 (2009) (citing to Khouzam v. Attorney
Gen. of United States, 549 F.3d 235, 250 (3rd Cir. 2008)). Contra Nature's Trust, supra note 44,
at 342 (discussing the need for a "massive global effort" to combat the causes of climate change
analogized to the efforts in World War II).
61 Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
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authority to evaluate the policy judgments that EPA offered as justification
for refusing to regulate motor vehicle emissions, such as issues involving
foreign relations." 26 2 The Comer court held that the requested relief by the
plaintiffs "constitute[d] non-justiciable political questions, because there
are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the
issues presented, and because the case would require the court to make
initial policy determinations that have been entrusted to the EPA by
Congress. "263 The Kivalina Court cited Am. Elec. Power Co. on the
presence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards by
contending that "[w]ell-settled principles of tort and public nuisance law
provide appropriate guidance to the district court in assessing plaintiffs'
claims and federal courts are competent to deal with these issues" such that
their global warming concerns can "be addressed through principled
adjudication." 26 4 In the ATL context, the court would be able to refer back
to the litany of PTD and climate change cases, such as those discussed
previously, in order to determine standards for managing the case.
The third prong of the Baker test is "the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion."265 This step may be the most difficult for a claim under the
ATL theory, as the Court may be asked to determine whether the emissions
from an individual company are in excess of what reasonable levels are and
thus "the court must make a policy judgment of a legislative nature, rather
than resolving the dispute through legal and factual analysis." 266 The goal
of this prong is to respect the balance of powers in the United States'
system of governance by "preventing a court from 'removing an important
policy determination from the Legislature.' 267 The Kivalina Court
reasoned that what the Plaintiffs were requesting, despite their denials, was
a political judgment "that the two dozen Defendants named in this action
should be the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to global warming"
based solely on the belief that "they are responsible for more of the
problem than anyone else in the nation." 268The Court in California v.
6 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863 (S.D. Miss. 2012) affd, 718 F.3d
460 (5th Cir. 2013).
63 Id. at 866.
64 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (citing to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals holding in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,329 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd,
Amer. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)).
16s See supra note 260.
' Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (citing EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400
F.3d 774, 784 (9th Cir. 2005)).
6 Id. (citing to In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d
291, 297 (S.D.N.Y.2006)).
'6s Id. at 877.
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General Motors Corp. reasoned that "[t]he political branches' actions and
deliberate inactions in the area of global warming further highlight this case
as one for nonjudicial discretion." 2 69 The Court also further reasoned that
policy determinations, like those concerning carbon dioxide standards, "lie
with the political branches of government, and not with the courts. "270
Without touching on the issue of displacement by virtue of EPA regulation,
as set forth by Congress in the Clean Air Act and recognized in American
Electric Power, the likelihood of a claim under the theory of ATL
surviving a challenge based on justiciability of the issue due to political
question can be shown to be very low given the nature of the regulatory
scheme as it exists today.
When looking at the three ATL cases that have had an initial
hearing, two of the three cases survived because the State Legislature had
previously amended the respective constitutions to include a provision for
preservation or conservation of the air as a resource for the State.271 The
legislature's enactment of constitutional amendments permitted the courts
to review the cases rather than being forced to dismiss the cases as non-
justicable, which was the result in the third case.
C. ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH PRIVATE NUISANCE OR
POLITICAL ACTION
The discussion in this paper leads to one of two possible solutions
for addressing climate change. The first option is to address climate change
through private nuisance, as in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, to
remedy an injury caused by climate change for an individual landowner.273
The second option is to address climate change by seeking political action,
such as the addition of air as a resource (this was previously done by the
State legislatures in Bonser-Lain and Filippone).274 The situation in Bonser
Lain and Filippone are indicative of the issue facing ATL-as Professor
Mary Wood admits -that the end goal of the theory is to promote political
" California v. Gen. Motors Corp., C06-05755 MUJ, 2007 WL 2726871 *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007).
0 Id. at *10 (citing to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
171 See generally Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 2; Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561 at *1. Contra
Brewer 2013 WL 1091209 at *3; Barhaugh, 361 Mont. at 1.
Id.
See supra note 117 (discussing that in Bell, the plaintiffs sought relief for adverse effects to
their property as a result of pollution, in the form of particulate matter being emitted from the
neighboring generating station, under a theory of private nuisance).
274 See supra note 271; See also Nature's Trust, supra note 44, at 346-47 (discussing efforts to
combat climate change on a localized basis much as the Government's bond drive and
conservation efforts were done in World War II).
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change. In Filippone, the political question issue was avoided because
the court was reviewing the district court's ruling on the Iowa Department
of Natural Resources' response to the plaintiff s request for rulemaking.27 6
This outcome in Filippone is useful for illustrating that ATL, in the most
basic sense, is an attempt to utilize the courts to engage in action as a result
of unfavorable outcomes in the political process. The facts of Bonser
Lain and Brewer also indicate the same pattern of requesting rulemaking by
the State Agency in charge of environmental regulations and once the
request is rejected then proceeding to petition for review of that decision.278
While the courts can be useful for prompting agencies to avoid the
dereliction of their statutory or common law duties, the use of the courts to
push forward issues that ought to be resolved in the political process is not
permitted.279 Therefore, the best way to combat climate change in a
jurisdiction that has not amended the state constitution is to pursue that
change and statutorily define the air or atmosphere as a resource that the
government must protect for the good of the people.280 When a party has
suffered an injury or will imminently suffer a harm a third party's
misconduct, then the court system is the place to seek remedies for that
harm, if the burden is sufficiently carried. But the way forward in resolving
the climate change dilemma ought not to "require tortured constructions of
the present" in seeking to expand the PTD.
CONCLUSION
In the search to hold a party responsible for misconduct on the
issue of GHG emissions that contribute to title change, a theory has been
put forth based on the PTD. The Public Trust is a common law doctrine
that holds certain resources, traditionally related to navigable water ways,
5 See supra note 65 (noting the plan to reduce carbon emissions, but that these options may be
outside the scope of the Court's oversight thus questionable under the doctrines of non-
justiciability).
6 Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 1.
Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 1 (citing, "Filippone filed a petition for judicial review on July 21,
2011." The plaintiff filed her petition for judicial review nearly one month after the unfavorable
outcome from the Iowa DNR ruled on the request for rulemaking).
1See Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561; Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209 at *1-2.
1 See supra note 766; Cf Baker, 369 U.S. at 186; Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at
863; Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863 (S.D. Miss. 2012) affd, 718 F.3d
460 (5th Cir. 2013); Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 309. Contra Nature's Trust, supra note 44;
Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43.
80 See supra note 267.
81 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 497; Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1131; See generally Changing
Conceptions, supra note 31; See supra note 8.
. See generally Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43.
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as an asset in trust for the benefit of the "whole of the people" and the
government must manage these resources in a responsible fashion to meet
that purpose.283 The ATL theory modifies the public trust beyond the
traditional scope to include additional assets, such as the air or
atmosphere.284 Once a sovereign is subject to a fiduciary duty under the
trust, the theory would seek to expand responsibility to all the remaining
2815sovereigns.
The potential claims for climate change vary between that of an
actual harm 28 6 to that of an imminent harm from a failure to engage in
rulemaking. The theory of harm has also touched on a public nuisance
that provides an avenue for relief for a large group of individuals,2  which
could also be in the form of grouped, individualized private nuisance
claims, or by entities representing large groups of private citizens.289
Claims have also started to arise under the ATL theory, 2 90 but the results
have varied based on whether or not the claimants' jurisdictions had
previously provided protection for air quality, the air in general, or even all
resources. 291
While the ATL theory has enjoyed some success thus far, the basic
premise of the theory expands the doctrine of Public Trust beyond its
traditional scope of navigable water ways by relying on reasoning like a
"tortured [construction]" of Tennessee Copper Co. 292 The ATL theory also
faces potential challenges to meeting the burden of standing 293 and avoiding
violating the political question doctrine294 to find the claim non-justiciable.
The way forward based on the issues of pursuing a claim under ATL
8 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387.
See generally Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43; See also Nature's Trust, supra
note 44.
285 Id.
81 See generally Bell, 2013 WL 4418637 at *1.
8 See Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1131; Native Village of
Kivalina; Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863 (S.D. Miss. 2012) affd, 718
F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).
21 See Bell, 2013 WL 4418637 at *1.
89 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 309; Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
2 See generally Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 43; Nature's Trust, supra note 44.
291 See Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561 at * 1; Filippone, 829
N.W.2d at 2; Kanuk, 2012 WL 8262431 at *1. Contra Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209 at *1;
Barhaugh, 361 Mont. at 1.
2 See generally Cool Lawsuits, supra note 51; Changing Conceptions, supra note 31; Misuse of
Public Nuisance; See supra note 102 (reasoning the right of the State of Georgia to protect harms
to their citizens from misconduct by Tennessee Copper Co.).
21 See Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555; Bellon, 732 F.3d at
1131.
2 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2527; Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Nixon v. U.S., 506
U.S. 224 (1993); Baker, 369 U.S. at 186; Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849,
863 (S.D. Miss. 2012) aff d, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013); Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 863. Contra California v. Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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should be remedied by separating claims into (1) a private nuisance action,
(2) a claim for denial of rulemaking where the state has provided a duty to
protect air as a resource, or (3) political action to have that right
provided.295
We think of our land and water and human resources not as static
and sterile possessions but as life giving assets to be directed by
wise provisions for future days. We seek to use our natural
resources not as a thing apart but as something that is interwoven
with industry, labor, finance, taxation, agriculture, homes,
recreation, good citizenship.
Franklin D. Roosevelt 296
's See Bell, 2013 WL 4418637 at *1; Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 2; Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL
3164561 at *1. Contra Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Brewer 2013 WL 1091209 at *3;
Barhaugh, 361 Mont. at 1; See also Caroline Cress, Comment, It's Time to Let Go: Why the
Atmospheric Trust Won't Help the World Breathe Easier, 92 N.C.L. Rev. 236 (2013) (noting
other rationales for why ATL faces an uphill battle in implementation of the theory).
96 BYRON W. DAYNES & GLEN SUSSMAN, WHITE HOUSE POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 30
(2010), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=HIOQ1FYHtcYC&pg=PA3O#v onepage.
